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Elaboration 14.1

Since stupidology is so important for mind-scientists, so necessary to even understand the most daily-life behaviour (control by State, Church, and Fashion, or laws, religious rituals, and applause) and ... so amusing and entertaining, I cannot but add an extra Elaboration, describing something from my notations during my study. The reader might accept Spencer's explanation of how all behaviour, even of scientists, scientific institutions, philosophers, teachers, parents, officials, workers, etc. is solely dictated by applause, by decor and ornament instead of usefulness, by irrationality instead of rationality, but he might have doubts about war. Surely, this ugly business of killing by the mass, is too serious a thing to be dictated by applause, surely only effect counts, rationality is the measure? The reader would be wrong. War and things certainly are insanities themselves, yet, they are glossed over by general applause-gathering, thus, naked stupidity. I, here, will suppose that the rational in war means that we kill as many of the enemy as possible, with the least loss of life on our side, nay, for each person, the overall dictate is to do the work but stay alive as long as possible. This latter, the old Greeks new already, and, while it was excusable to lose one's spear, it was inexcusable to lose one's shield. In Sparta, a man was distinguished for utter bravery in battle (defending Sparta), but at the same time punished for doing so as he came out of his bed, naked. The English officer who, on a cutting-out expedition, encountered a Spanish officer without his sword, just waited with his attack until the man had his sword with him, was violating these principles (stupidity) because, he risked his life unnecessarily. The Spanish sword could have killed him. Due to the blood-sport game rules of war, even his boss, the king, would not have taken it up as such. This sort of sportmanship, the incompatibility of being humane while being inhumane, of stupidity over necessity, has been as old as war-history itself, yet remains what it is, stupid. Has this an equivalent in modern warfare? Indeed, when applause is the rule, stupidity should be the characteristic here too. It would go too far to mention Schwarzschild's array of stupidities of after World War 1, of preparing for World War 2, of diplomatic stupidity in general. I id not even note them in my note-book on stupidology because it would mean reproducing the entire work. Look at World War 2. What is easier than repeat the first intelligent trick of our ancestors, the standardization of (speech) sounds for ideas? Simple standardization. Like all the wars one can find since Iliad, they are on a level of intelligent organization, standardization, only one step above random. The. 303 rifle ammunition fitted most of the . 303 rifles and that was that. It was all very well to have utter confusion by diversity playing about in Britain, but is was a different matter when, as in Overlord, the invasion in Normandy, the poor soldiers had to go and face soldiers that normally would take 2. 5 or 3 lives for one of their own. Three different types of ammunitions for side-arms (Lee Enfield, Garand, Carabine), and three for revolver, 9 mm pistol,. 45 pistol, etc. with all the confusion of shipping and unloading, distributing. Fifteen if not more sorts of cars with all the different spare-parts, maintenance, even driving problems. All indications beforehand, during and after showed that it was to be a show, not serious business. A show for world-opinion, a show for local newspapers, a show for the war correspondents, etc. (see Hastings (1985) 'Overlord') no concern for the lives of men. When we take the (stupid) battle for the Arnhem bridge for instance, let's look at Ryan's work 'One Bridge Too Far'. We shall see that stupidity, silly gathering of applause was the (almost) only drive. From the highest general, down to the simplest man in the field, quotations are in my notes as stupidological items. There was a high officer, e.g. who was proud of not wearing a helmet. How is such a man able to make his men understand that helmets save lives? Again, the Greeks already knew that to kill an officer is far more effective than killing a platoon, company even battalion. Officers should even take less superfluous risks than men. Yet, another officer was so concerned about his walking-stick, that upon landing (the whole operation was by air transport) he first went and search for it under murderous enemy fire, instead of starting 'being' an officer. The highest general, the one who planned it all (stupidly), had a private applause-battle with the overall commander (general Eisenhower) about his rival (Patton), and had won. One of the earliest stupidities, if there is such a thing in a battle stupidly planned and with a take-off under a precious payload of life chicken, dancing-shoes, etc. was the shooting down of a glider on the first day with the full plans for the consecutive operation aboard. It allowed the German command to form a complete picture of the state of affairs, which would normally take painful intelligence work and reconstruction. It also allowed them to verify the genuineness of the plan by compairing it with the following up. The German officer needed not be surprised by this stupidity, since, before the occupation of the lower countries, a similar thing had happened with the German plans found in a plane in Belgium. A general worth his salt, should know Spencer's dictum that 'what can go wrong, will go wrong', he should also know that even mice can decide a battle (Herodotus) as an Italian general in Russia found to his chagrin. The mice had eaten the insulation of the electric wires in the tanks. All paperwork on the plans therefore, should have been left at home. Life chickens and dancing shoes? Indeed, it had all been taken on the flight, a flight on which every inch and pound was to be paid for in blood. There was also a man who had taken his hunting-gear. Rational soldiers would instead have taken extra ammo clips or emergency rations, sticking plaster or splints. There was a total break down in radio contact with England and with the relieving army in the south. Stupid of course, but the poor sacrificees did not even know that all they had to do was get to the nearest telephone. The Dutch underground had fixed extra connections in the exchanges that proved serviceable (too late). What with the need to be able to cross the river, and a ferry extant but unknown to the forces. The ferryman had little to do anyway! There was a man who risked his life under fierce fire, to retrieve a pannier dropped by air. They were being shot at by an enemy who was feeding on their dropped rations, and by ammunition also dropped for them. He opened the pannier and what was in it, flown all the way from England? ... red berets. (Compare this with a precious plane-flight into the German enclosure before Stalingrad that consisted of ... condoms). When they had to plan and make their escape over the Rhine in the night, through enemy fire, what did they do to prepare for the moment? Exactly, they held a religious service (superstition was just a rife as in Xenophon's time), and some even had to shave, in order, as the saying was, to arrive as soldiers on the other side. These stupidities, the applause dictate, are to be found all over every war that is known to us. The reader who has grasped this genesis and workings of stupidity, of applause, should re-read his very enjoyable literature again. The Herodotus, Xenophon and Thucydides, the Cicero, Tacitus, Suetonius, Polybius, etc., etc. and experience a whole new insight in the people described. It really is all applause (41.3) that is at the core of the most disastrous or amusing instances (Apronia's defenestration too).
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Next: Elaboration 14.2 Up: Elaboration 14 Previous: Elaboration 14
Ven 2007-09-11