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Elaboration 14.1
Since stupidology is so important for mind-scientists, so necessary
to even understand the most daily-life behaviour (control by State,
Church, and Fashion, or laws, religious rituals, and applause) and
... so amusing and entertaining, I cannot but add an extra
Elaboration, describing something from my notations during my study.
The reader might accept Spencer's explanation of how all behaviour,
even of scientists, scientific institutions, philosophers, teachers,
parents, officials, workers, etc. is solely dictated by applause, by
decor and ornament instead of usefulness, by irrationality instead
of rationality, but he might have doubts about war. Surely, this
ugly business of killing by the mass, is too serious a thing to be
dictated by applause, surely only effect counts, rationality is the
measure? The reader would be wrong. War and things certainly are
insanities themselves, yet, they are glossed over by general
applause-gathering, thus, naked stupidity. I, here, will suppose
that the rational in war means that we kill as many of the enemy as
possible, with the least loss of life on our side, nay, for each
person, the overall dictate is to do the work but stay alive as long
as possible. This latter, the old Greeks new already, and, while it
was excusable to lose one's spear, it was inexcusable to lose one's
shield. In Sparta, a man was distinguished for utter bravery in
battle (defending Sparta), but at the same time punished for doing
so as he came out of his bed, naked. The English officer who, on a
cutting-out expedition, encountered a Spanish officer without his
sword, just waited with his attack until the man had his sword with
him, was violating these principles (stupidity) because, he risked
his life unnecessarily. The Spanish sword could have killed him. Due
to the blood-sport game rules of war, even his boss, the king, would
not have taken it up as such. This sort of sportmanship, the
incompatibility of being humane while being inhumane, of stupidity
over necessity, has been as old as war-history itself, yet remains
what it is, stupid. Has this an equivalent in modern warfare?
Indeed, when applause is the rule, stupidity should be the
characteristic here too. It would go too far to mention
Schwarzschild's array of stupidities of after World War 1, of
preparing for World War 2, of diplomatic stupidity in general. I id
not even note them in my note-book on stupidology because it would
mean reproducing the entire work. Look at World War 2. What is
easier than repeat the first intelligent trick of our ancestors, the
standardization of (speech) sounds for ideas? Simple
standardization. Like all the wars one can find since Iliad, they
are on a level of intelligent organization, standardization, only
one step above random. The. 303 rifle ammunition fitted most of the
. 303 rifles and that was that. It was all very well to have utter
confusion by diversity playing about in Britain, but is was a
different matter when, as in Overlord, the invasion in Normandy, the
poor soldiers had to go and face soldiers that normally would take
2. 5 or 3 lives for one of their own. Three different types of
ammunitions for side-arms (Lee Enfield, Garand, Carabine), and three
for revolver, 9 mm pistol,. 45 pistol, etc. with all the confusion
of shipping and unloading, distributing. Fifteen if not more sorts
of cars with all the different spare-parts, maintenance, even
driving problems. All indications beforehand, during and after
showed that it was to be a show, not serious business. A show for
world-opinion, a show for local newspapers, a show for the war
correspondents, etc. (see Hastings (1985) 'Overlord') no concern for
the lives of men. When we take the (stupid) battle for the Arnhem
bridge for instance, let's look at Ryan's work 'One Bridge Too Far'.
We shall see that stupidity, silly gathering of applause was the
(almost) only drive. From the highest general, down to the simplest
man in the field, quotations are in my notes as stupidological
items. There was a high officer, e.g. who was proud of not wearing a
helmet. How is such a man able to make his men understand that
helmets save lives? Again, the Greeks already knew that to kill an
officer is far more effective than killing a platoon, company even
battalion. Officers should even take less superfluous risks than
men. Yet, another officer was so concerned about his walking-stick,
that upon landing (the whole operation was by air transport) he
first went and search for it under murderous enemy fire, instead of
starting 'being' an officer. The highest general, the one who
planned it all (stupidly), had a private applause-battle with the
overall commander (general Eisenhower) about his rival (Patton), and
had won. One of the earliest stupidities, if there is such a thing
in a battle stupidly planned and with a take-off under a precious
payload of life chicken, dancing-shoes, etc. was the shooting down
of a glider on the first day with the full plans for the consecutive
operation aboard. It allowed the German command to form a complete
picture of the state of affairs, which would normally take painful
intelligence work and reconstruction. It also allowed them to verify
the genuineness of the plan by compairing it with the following up.
The German officer needed not be surprised by this stupidity, since,
before the occupation of the lower countries, a similar thing had
happened with the German plans found in a plane in Belgium. A
general worth his salt, should know Spencer's dictum that 'what can
go wrong, will go wrong', he should also know that even mice can
decide a battle (Herodotus) as an Italian general in Russia found to
his chagrin. The mice had eaten the insulation of the electric wires
in the tanks. All paperwork on the plans therefore, should have been
left at home. Life chickens and dancing shoes? Indeed, it had all
been taken on the flight, a flight on which every inch and pound was
to be paid for in blood. There was also a man who had taken his
hunting-gear. Rational soldiers would instead have taken extra ammo
clips or emergency rations, sticking plaster or splints. There was a
total break down in radio contact with England and with the
relieving army in the south. Stupid of course, but the poor
sacrificees did not even know that all they had to do was get to the
nearest telephone. The Dutch underground had fixed extra connections
in the exchanges that proved serviceable (too late). What with the
need to be able to cross the river, and a ferry extant but unknown
to the forces. The ferryman had little to do anyway! There was a man
who risked his life under fierce fire, to retrieve a pannier dropped
by air. They were being shot at by an enemy who was feeding on their
dropped rations, and by ammunition also dropped for them. He opened
the pannier and what was in it, flown all the way from England? ...
red berets. (Compare this with a precious plane-flight into the
German enclosure before Stalingrad that consisted of ... condoms).
When they had to plan and make their escape over the Rhine in the
night, through enemy fire, what did they do to prepare for the
moment? Exactly, they held a religious service (superstition was
just a rife as in Xenophon's time), and some even had to shave, in
order, as the saying was, to arrive as soldiers on the other side.
These stupidities, the applause dictate, are to be found all over
every war that is known to us. The reader who has grasped this
genesis and workings of stupidity, of applause, should re-read his
very enjoyable literature again. The Herodotus, Xenophon and
Thucydides, the Cicero, Tacitus, Suetonius, Polybius, etc., etc. and
experience a whole new insight in the people described. It really is
all applause (41.3) that is at the core of the
most disastrous or amusing instances (Apronia's defenestration too).
Next: Elaboration 14.2
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Ven
2007-09-11