Introduction

The hypothesis that human cognition may be well characterized as a set of Bayesian computations has been the topic of considerable debate over the last two decades. Recently, critics have argued that this hypothesis is either unlikely to be true or otherwise too unconstrained to be particularly useful for explaining cognition (e.g., Bowers & Davis, 2012), whereas proponents have defended their position by stating that the Bayesian perspective has been misunderstood, is not necessarily in conflict with other perspectives on cognition, and can still be explanatorily useful as a framework for cognitive science even if under-constrained in many ways (e.g., Griffiths, Chater, Norris, & Pouget, 2012). Our position in this debate is that both sides of this debate may be right as well as wrong: Proponents may be right that the Bayesian perspective has something uniquely useful to bring to cognitive science (and then the critics are wrong in their denial of this); yet, the critics may be right that cognitive theories are explanatorily useful only if properly constrained (and then proponents are wrong in their denial of this).

With this perspective in mind, we wish to move the debate forward in a constructive way by bringing in new perspectives and proposing novel constraints that can be exploited for purposes of improving the explanatory values and virtues of Bayesian explanations of cognition. Specifically, with this symposium we aim to focus on how constraints on Bayesian explanations can be exploited in ways that are yet underrepresented and underexplored.

The symposium brings together researchers from various disciplines, contributing a variety of perspectives on how Bayesian explanations can be fruitfully constrained, drawing on theories, analyses, and results from philosophy of science, cognitive neuroscience, information theory, machine learning, and theoretical computer science.
A crucial feature of adequate explanations in the cognitive sciences is that they reveal aspects of the causal structure of the mechanism that produces the phenomenon to be explained. The kind of unification afforded by the Bayesian framework to cognitive science does not necessarily reveal the causal structure of a mechanism (cf. Colombo & Seriès, 2012). Bayesian unification is the product of the mathematics rather than of a causal hypothesis concerning how different cognitive phenomena are brought about by a single type of mechanism. Nonetheless, Bayesian unification can place fruitful constraints on causal mechanical explanation, which will be elucidated in this talk.

Bayesian modeling and heuristic strategies for model-development
Carlos Zednik (joint work with Frank Jäkel)

It is generally agreed that Bayesian models in cognitive science operate at Marr’s computational level of analysis (Marr, 1982). Unfortunately, it remains unclear exactly how the computational, algorithmic, and implementation levels are related.

This talk explicates inter-level relationships in terms of heuristic strategies for model-development (Zednik, in press). Specifically, Bayesian computational-level models play the heuristic role of suggesting possible algorithms to compute a particular function, and of suggesting particular ways of delineating and interpreting the components of a physical mechanism. In turn, algorithmic and mechanistic models specify memory, time, and resource limitations that constrain the cognitive tasks described by Bayesian models. In contrast to the view that Bayesian computational-level modeling is independent of low-level considerations, on this view the development of Bayesian models is constrained by, and at the same time itself constrains, the development of models at lower levels of analysis.

From Bayesian ideal observers to approximate probabilistic inference in the cortex: the case of bistable perception
David P. Reichert

The recent debate concerning the merit of Bayesian models of cognition seems due in part to a disagreement, or even confusion, with regards to what Bayesian models of cognition 'are about' (Bowers & Davis, 2012; Jones & Love, 2011). There appears to be some consensus however that there is a need for models that seek to explain how (approximate) probabilistic inference could be realized in the brain. An example of this type of approach is found in my own work on modeling bistable perception as emerging from sampling-based approximate probabilistic inference, implemented in a deep neural network (Reichert et al., 2011; Reichert, 2012). Using this work as a starting point and contrasting it to related approaches on the same topic, I will argue for a more fine-grained conceptual distinction between different probabilistic or Bayesian models. I will thus characterize several conceptual dimensions that distinguish between ideal observer models and the various types of models of psychological constructs or neuronal processing. On the basis of this clarification of what Bayesian models are about, I identify challenges faced by computational neuroscience models that seek to directly map Bayesian computations onto neuronal implementations.

References