Elaboration 2

A word about science is desirable here. In general, there is a battle of words going on everywhere in efforts to classify some idea, theory, packet of knowledge as-, or as not-, belonging to a science. First of all, science, a science, is not to be found in our reality except in a mind, a human mind too. Therefore it is strictly NON-physical, is but mental, ideational in class. Ideation Theory (see e.g. Ladd 1907), then, is that branch of ideas, that can define and elucidate the term (is name of idea), science. 'Science is a construct of related ideas, capable of being a whole (idea) ' is not so much untrue but too wide. A whole personality would fit it, and so would art. Huxley (T. H.) said "By science I understand all knowledge that rests upon evidence and reasoning". Again, it fits every individual (plant, animal, man), it is another word for 'mind'. F. J. Tegart defines science as merely "the systematic investigation of the processes manifested in phenomena". It means not simply wanting to know, but, (first) developing a system, a program, for tackling the job. Somewhat better is the formulation of F. J. C. Hearnshaw who maintains that science is "systematized, organized, formulated knowledge". All this, then, does not go for primitive man or a child, or does it? On the other hand, we would not be ashamed to call the activities of a little boy or girl, who is experimenting with a trickle of water, in damming it up, scratch a canal in it, see pool formation, etc. a form of (primitive) science. We know from ideation theory (29.1) that it is a necessity in nature that phylo-genesis is identical with ontogenesis, that the development of an individual must be a (fast) replica of the development of mankind (Haeckel). Ordening theory says that onto-genesis is the structural memory of phylo-genesis (Mijling). This, as Spencer admits freely, does not stop at birth. The same phylo = onto, goes for the little baby = savage, or the child = primitive man. Naturally, the teaching of a science by following the natural historical development of that science is obvious (the only method is nature's method). The child's experimenting and wanting to understand, is no more than a stage, an early stage in its scientific development. We all are in a reality. We always and solely, want to know about this reality, i.e. we ideate, we have ideas, we manipulate them and so do we with reality itself. This, we usually do not call science, it is simply knowing that water makes wet, and that we seek shelter for the rain. It is ideation in its broadest sense, common sense. Science then, is not just a whole that we want to know about, this is true for all ideation, is typical for life. A general practitioner is not so much a scientist though, but he uses his acquired science for his first aid. But, as in a story by Cronin, when such a practitioner becomes interested in a certain field or viewpoint of his job, and investigates special occasions or relations in order to add to the general knowledge, he certainly is a scientist. But Hoyle's concept of science being pure prediction is not complete either. Prediction comes only after one has some knowledge in order to know what to predict. The early tinkers with glass rods, fur, rubber, magnets, sparks, etc. did not guess that this would lead to electric engines, heaters and light, silicon chips and space-flight. Yet, they were scientists as well as investigators. Because a definition, like a Vennian circle, must typefy a class (i.e. including and excluding), a name for the idea, a word, is the shortest definition possible. A more extensive definition, then, should be used for those ideas that are too complex for one word or, for mere explanation of an idea or group of ideas. Science, being practically a translation of (human) ideation, should be somewhat vaguely defined, excluding all superstitions, but including these electronic scientists of Edison's time, whose latter, for many of their contemporaries were merely playing about. If I would try my hand on a definition: Science is specialized (human) involvement in a systematized whole of ideas that are demonstrable to-, or likely to-, reflect reality in some measure, without direct promise for pay-off in the reality. In this way, it is not found in books, films, magazines, but only in those who attend to them. The letters are there but the ideas not. Nowadays, unfortunately, the bulk of scientific publications are merely heaps of letters and punctuations on piles of sheet-paper. The reason is the duty, the compulsion, in the scientific workers to publish. They are under a real threat of dismissal when they do not publish enough. They, therefore, have a tendency to repeat others, to invent data even fuddle them, develop meaningless theories, become infatuated by these, and they publish and publish. This compulsion, like copyrights, is the guillotine of true, new, fresh, invigorating science. The only scientific department in which triviality writing and data bungling, nonsense theorizing is not in the least subject to self-punishment, self-correction, is the mind science department (except unheeded, unread ones like Spencer, Wells, Andreski, etc.). The monthly tons of paper added to the library of a social science department of a university consist merely of their purely physical properties. Tons of printed paper, no progress, no newness, no healthy ideas, no incentive for the students or workers to become attached (29.2). The accompanying industries have contrived to screen-off any attempt of a real mind-science to be published. Like all products of industries, books and journals no longer are made because of a need for them in mankind, but are made because of the survival of the industry itself, its sales-department. Competition then, of a product that is badly needed, that lasts for all ages, with those products that are not needed but have been made to wear fast, to be renewed, resold, reproduced, proves fruitless. Every motorcar producer could easily make a car that can be kept running with little cost for 50 years (as the model T and A Ford suggested) but this would break his own windows. As it is, there is no sense in trying to publish real social scientific-, i.e. mind scientific work. There is a necessity for handbooks on 'Ordening', on 'ideation, trance, ethics, the process of digitalization, analogization, the essence of curation, binary code as meaning, etc. ', but nobody would publish them. It has to wait for a change in these stupid circumstances. When is the science of Ordening going to be aimed at progress, at addition to knowledge, at improvement in theory?